O ver the years, many attempts have been made to reform government regulation, but success has been very limited. These efforts have been severely hampered by distrust on both sides of the regulatory debate. Individuals committed to protecting public health, safety, and the environment are suspicious of any effort that is seen as possibly obstructing or delaying their objectives. In contrast, people advocating the reduction of "big government" decry those who would proceed rapidly to address various problems with costly or ill-designed remedies.
To reconcile these two polar extremes, or at least to narrow the gap between them, it is necessary to raise the level of understanding of the galaxy of issues involved. That objective, in turn, requires a far better flow of information, one based on sound science and professional analysis. Moreover, a broader approach is in order in the regulatory process than has been customary.
The most carefully constructed and well-grounded analysis, however, can antagonize citizen groups, which may jump to the conclusion that wetlands are about to be paved over or national forests sold to the highest bidder. Any successful and comprehensive reform must have a perspective that is not threatening to the widespread concerns of citizens--and that positive approach to achieving the nation's social priorities must be translated into reality.
In that spirit, the various parties to the regulatory debate should recognize that the American people believe there is a legitimate need for government regulation to achieve economic and social goals of high priority to the nation. There are many areas in which regulation is accepted without question. Airline safety is an obvious example; the public is reassured by the licensing of pilots. Similarly, restrictions on child labor in the United States are no longer controversial. Agencies such as the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), and the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) may be viewed as bureaucratic and burdensome "alphabet soup" by those subject to their rulings, but the public at large strongly supports continuing government involvement in their areas of responsibility. Serious shortcomings in market outcomes and in the conduct of business often generate or increase public support for government intervention in private-sector decision making.
However, the process of regulation--the way in which a national priority or concern is translated into a specific rule--is not widely understood. It does not begin when a government agency issues a ruling. Rather, it starts much earlier, when Congress passes a law establishing a regulatory agency and gives it a mandate to issue rules governing some activity. The writing of the specific statute, which has been largely ignored by most organized efforts at regulatory reform, is usually the most important action in what is an extended rule-making process. Basic defects in the enabling legislation cannot be cured by the regulatory agency concerned or anywhere else in the executive branch.
Regulations are promulgated by agencies in response to laws passed by Congress to address some perceived "market failure" or to achieve a social goal. Regulatory proceedings are not, for the most part, mere matters of procedure and conformance. Rather, they spring from the desire for clean air, safe drinking water, safe workplaces, reliable financial markets, improved medicines, and competitive industries.
Yet, achieving these desirable results is far more complicated than is commonly understood. It is not simply a matter of Congress proclaiming worthy goals or an executive branch agency promulgating rules to that effect. The regulatory process is fundamentally bureaucratic, with all the powers and shortcomings associated with government. Even at its best, regulation is a blunt and imperfect tool. Far too often, it imposes costs that greatly outweigh the benefits achieved, often unnecessarily.
In seriously considering the subject of regulation, an important distinction needs to be made between two types: economic regulation, historically used by such agencies as the Federal Communications Commission (FCC), the Maritime Commission, and two agencies which Congress has terminated, the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB) and the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC), and social regulation, performed by EPA, OSHA, and similar government agencies of fairly recent origin. The characteristics of the two types of regulation are very different and so are the ways of improving them.
Economic regulation relates primarily to such aspects of business as prices, profits, entry, and exit. Typically, an agency or commission regulates a specific sector of the economy, such as transportation, communications, utilities, or banking. Social regulation, in contrast, is characterized by the use of agencies organized along functional or issue lines (ecology, discrimination, product safety) rather than industry categories. Many of these agencies have power to regulate across all industries, although their jurisdiction is limited to one aspect of business activity.
Since the 1970s there has been a strong and consistent effort to reform or eliminate economic regulations where competition adequately serves the public interest. Thus, the CAB and the ICC have been terminated; the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) no longer regulates brokers' commission rates; and the FCC is beginning, somewhat fitfully, to let competition replace rate regulation in the rapidly changing telecommunications industry.
The staffing of federal economic regulatory agencies (nearly 30,000 persons in 1997) is dwarfed by the much larger array of inspectors, reviewers, and other officials of federal agencies engaged in social regulation (almost 94,000 in number). However, there has been no sustained effort to reduce social regulations. On the contrary, the recent tendency has been to expand the scope of this activity.
In some cases, citizens become so used to regulation that they forget the value of marketplace competition in protecting consumers. For decades, regulation by the ICC was accepted by the trucking industry as a fact of life. But since the effective dismantling of these controls in the early 1980s, thousands of additional firms have entered this market, and the cost of transporting goods in the United States has been reduced by billions of dollars a year. The demise of the ICC goes unmourned.
Thus, substantial progress has been made in deregulating some key sectors of the economy--notably transportation, communication, and financial services--in which competition does an effective job of protecting consumer interests. The United States has enjoyed large productivity gains in these sectors relative to other industrial economies because it has successfully challenged the traditional approach of selecting regulation or public ownership for utilities and related industries and opted instead for the relatively "radical" solution of competition.
It is helpful to recall the limits as well as the advantages of reliance on the market mechanism. Marketplace competition is not an effective way of directing people to follow very specific courses of action. Control of automobile traffic provides an example. Traffic lights, stop signs, and similar command-and-control devices are an accepted part of everyday life. However, for producing changes in behavior that are less specific or that differ among individuals or organizations, economic incentives can be useful. For example, lower fees for toll bridges and toll highways during off-peak hours can reduce the road congestion facing the command-and-control traffic system at peak hours of usage. Likewise, a statutory or administrative commandand-control apparatus can set a specific level of air or water purity for society to strive to achieve, but emission fees or tradable permits can achieve this same level of purity at lower cost than conventional regulatory control mechanisms.
The marketplace does not function perfectly. But the relevant question in any given instance is whether it works better than regulation. The response is less a matter of philosophy than of practicality. The answer can be "yes" or "no," depending on such factors as the type of regulation and the state of technology.
The costs imposed by regulation also are often broader than many people realize. In addition to specific equipment that may have to be added to an automobile or to a production line to meet a federal requirement, the government directive may also have powerful indirect influences. A case in point is the value of time that people must spend waiting in line for permits and inspections or filling out forms.
Using information from the U.S. Office of Management and Budget for fiscal year 1996, if we value the time of those filling out the forms very conservatively at the national average hourly earnings of about $16 an hour, the cost of the 6.8 billion hours consumed was about $110 billion. Since those actually performing much of the paperwork are likely to have earnings substantially above the average, the actual economic cost was no doubt even higher.
The impact on consumers can be even less transparent, especially since regulations often have unintended consequences. Take the case of a federal requirement that the household ladder be made safer. Such an action
